A new Definition and Classification of Physical Unclonable Functions by Plaga, Rainer & Merli, Dominik
A new Definition and Classification of Physical Unclonable
Functions
Rainer Plaga
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
Godesberger Allee 185-189
Bonn, Germany
rainer.plaga@bsi.bund.de
Dominik Merli
Fraunhofer Research Institution AISEC
Parkring 4
Garching (near Munich), Germany
dominik.merli@aisec.fraunhofer.de
ABSTRACT
A new definition of “Physical Unclonable Functions” (PUFs),
the first one that fully captures its intuitive idea among ex-
perts, is presented. A PUF is an information-storage system
with a security mechanism that is
1. meant to impede the duplication of a precisely described
storage-functionality in another, separate system and
2. remains effective against an attacker with temporary ac-
cess to the whole original system.
A novel classification scheme of the security objectives and
mechanisms of PUFs is proposed and its usefulness to aid fu-
ture research and security evaluation is demonstrated. One
class of PUF security mechanisms that prevents an attacker
to apply all addresses at which secrets are stored in the
information-storage system, is shown to be closely analogous
to cryptographic encryption. Its development marks the
dawn of a new fundamental primitive of hardware-security
engineering: cryptostorage. These results firmly establish
PUFs as a fundamental concept of hardware security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: Physical Security; H.3.0
[Information Storage and Retrieval]: General
General Terms
Security
Keywords
ACM proceedings, Physical Unclonable Functions
1. INTRODUCTION
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)[1] were originally
understood as “hardware devices that are hard to character-
ize and can be uniquely identified” [1]. They have developed
into an important research topic in the field of hardware se-
curity within the past decade. There have been a number
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of attempts (summarized in section Section 2.1) to precisely
define what a member of the research community would in-
tuitively call a PUF. Searched for is a definition that con-
tains a complete and minimal list of the conditions that have
to be fulfilled to identify a device as a PUF. No necessary
condition must be absent. No superfluous condition, i.e. one
that PUFs can, but do not absolutely have to fulfill, must
be present. In section 2.2 we present a novel definition of
a PUF. We demonstrate that it really fulfills, for the first
time, both of the above demands.
A novel classification scheme for the PUF security objectives
and mechanisms is presented in Section 3. Its usefulness is
demonstrated by two examples. In Section 4 we show that
the PUF security mechanism “cryptostorage” has a funda-
mental importance similar to the one of cryptography. PUF
research is thus of a much more fundamental importance
than hitherto realized. We discuss how the new scheme mo-
tivates qualitatively novel questions for further research in
Section 5 and helps the certification of PUFs in Section 6
respectively. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. DEFINITION OF PUFS
2.1 Previous Proposals
In the following, we briefly sketch the development of the
ideas on which we base our proposal. Starting with an early
paper by Gassend et al. [1], most proposed definitions are
based on the concept of a physical challenge-response func-
tion which can be evaluated in a reproducible manner. Un-
til approx. 2010, most proposed definitions characterized
PUFs further by being “hard to characterize” [1], “hard to
predict” [2], “physically unclonable” [3] or “tamper resis-
tant” [4]. Such demands carry the problem that devices
which turn out to be predictable, clonable or tamper vul-
nerable are no longer PUFs according to the proposed defi-
nitions. However, e.g., in a certification process, the concept
of an “insecure, broken PUF” is clearly necessary. Indeed,
in practice, the community does not really employ such def-
initions because it universally continues to refer to inse-
cure PUFs that have been completely broken as “PUFs”.
Armknecht et al. [5] recognized this problem and defined
PUFs as physical functions PFs, i.e., they dropped the U
for “unclonable”. Such physical functions are digital memo-
ries because the latter are physical devices that always have
to realize a challenge-response mechanism: an address is ap-
plied as a challenge and the memory content is returned as
a response. The remaining problem is then: how to charac-
terize the specific characteristic of PUFs that sets it apart,
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e.g., from a standard memory stick, which is, of course, not
understood as a PUF in the community? An alternative to
identify it with absolute unclonability is to identify it with
certain features of the PUF architecture. Several definitions
[6, 7, 8] propose to identify the specific characteristic proper-
ties that we call below in Section 3 “complex-structure upon
production” and “cryptostorage”. We will discuss in Section
3.1.2 that these properties classify special security mecha-
nisms. But a demand for a special security mechanism in
its definition would render the PUF concept inflexible. E.g.
the information stored in a quantum token, discussed in sec-
tion 3.2, must be loaded after its production - otherwise the
storage is not secure. A definition that demands a loading
upon production would rather arbitrarily excludes quantum
tokens as PUFs.
We will explicitely identify the specific characteristic of PFs,
that we searched for in the previous paragraph in section
2.2.2.
2.2 Proposed Definition of PUFs and its
Meaning
2.2.1 Auxiliary and PUF Definition
We first formulate an auxiliary definition:
• Definition of a physical information-storage sys-
tem (1)
An information-storage system is a set of at least two
modules1 that are conceptually or physically perma-
nently connected. These modules (or parts of the mod-
ule if the system is a single module) have the following
purposes: a “storage module” can be put into a physi-
cal state H which is determined by the information in
a challenge C. This storage module is measured in this
state and the measurement result is reproducibly en-
coded as the information of a response R by another
“encoder module” of the total system. The set of all
Rs for all Cs is the information stored in the system.
This definition agrees with the intuitive idea of a digital
memory, and makes its relation to a challenge-response func-
tion precise. The challenges are the addresses at which
the physical information, the responses, are stored. An
information-storage system is depicted in Figure 1. The
term “reproducibly encoded” demands that a noise in the
responses is bounded.
• Definition of a PUF (2)
A PUF is a physical information-storage system that
is protected by a security mechanism which
1. has the security objective to render it more diffi-
cult to duplicate a precisely described storage func-
tionality of the system in another, separate sys-
tem.
2. is meant to remain effective against an active2 at-
tacker with temporary physical access to the whole
1A module is defined to be an artificial (the artificiality is
necessary to delimit PUFs from biometric systems, a closely
related concept with which the PUF concept is often com-
pared) physical system that is permanently physically con-
nected and serves a certain purpose. A physical system is
defined to be a set of materials and fields that is delimited
from the rest of the world in a well defined manner.
2Active means that she can change the system rather than
only passively listen.
C
R
Information−storage system
challenge measure
Storage module
Encoder module
Figure 1: Sketch of a physical information-storage
system, according to our definition. The dot-dashed
outer box symbolizes the whole system which usu-
ally is (but does not have to be) also a module, like
the storage- and encode-module always are.
system in its original form.
2.2.2 Explanation of the PUF Definition
The definition does not demand that a security-mechanism
actually does render the duplication more difficult, but only
that an implemented mechanism is meant to do so. This
avoids the circularity problem with earlier PUF definitions
discussed in Section 1 (“an insecure PUF is no PUF”). As
the following example shows security primitives are often
defined in an analogous manner:
• Definition of cryptographic encryption algorithm
(3)
A cryptographic encryption algorithm is a key-dependent
mapping from a cleartext string of bits to a cryptogram
string of bits. Its security objective is that an attacker
finds no algorithm for an inverse mapping (decryption)
of the cryptogram to the cleartext without the key. The
key is a string of bits on which the encryption algo-
rithm depends.
Caesar’s cipher is trivial to break, but still a cryptographic
encryption algorithm because there is a specific key depen-
dent mapping with the said objective. The precise storage
functionality is the most characteristic feature of a PUF.
It can go beyond the mere storage and release of informa-
tion, as in the case of public PUFs [9, 10], where a re-
lease of the response within a certain time frame is required.
Even if the functionality is merely the storage and release
of physical information, the objective can be to prevent du-
plication to different degrees as in the previous proposals of
a “physical” and “mathematical” duplication [3]. We will
come back to the classification of PUF security objectives in
Section 3.1.1. We define an “information-storage system”
as the system that actually stores the information (rather
than auxiliary systems for packaging, energy supply etc.).
Our definition of a PUF requires that the security mecha-
nism is based on the system’s storage-mechanism, because
otherwise it would not remain effective against an attacker
with full access to the original system. This makes the re-
quired security- and information-storage mechanism indivis-
ible, i.e., without the latter, the former cannot be realized.
Devices in which information-storage and security mecha-
nism are separable are no PUFs. This indivisibility, let us
call it “security-memory boundedness”, is the specific char-
acteristic of a PUF that was searched for in Section 2.1.
Another angle on the motivation for the second condition of
the PUF definition will be discussed in Section 2.2.4.
A main result of this paper is that the PUF definition list
is complete and minimal with the proposed conditions. No
other of the myriad other conditions that PUFs may well
fulfill, e.g., that the storage mechanism is noisy, that the se-
curity mechanism works without energy supply, etc., has to
be fulfilled to characterize a module as a PUF. Summarizing
we state:
A module is a PUF if and only if it fulfills both con-
ditions of the definition (2).
2.2.3 Exemplary Analysis: Arbiter PUF
Characterized as a PUF
As an exemplary case, we discuss how the arbiter PUF
[11] is characterized as a PUF in the sense of our definition.
The arbiter PUF has a storage module in the form of a chain
of multiplexers that are programmed by a certain number
of inputs which act as a challenge. The encoder module is
a latch that determines which of two delay paths - that are
configured (with other words “put in a physical state”) by
the challenge - produced a longer delay for two test signals.
The arbiter PUF is thus an information-storage system in
our sense. The security mechanism is described by Suh and
Devadas as: “a set of challenges (is mapped) to a set of re-
sponses based on an intractably complex physical system.”
The unclonable storage-functionality is the release of a re-
sponse after a challenge is supplied. The authors make clear
that this must be understood as an objective rather than a
property because “to prevent model-building attacks” a fur-
ther development of the PUF architecture might be needed.
Thus the first condition of our definition of a PUF is ful-
filled. The “intractably complex structure” upon production
is meant to protect against an attacker with temporary ac-
cess to the storage system. Therefore, the second condition
of our definition (2) is fulfilled, too.
2.2.4 Delimitation of PUFs from other Concepts
Conventional secure memories, as typically realized, e.g.,
in smartcards as conventional digital memories with some
passive or active protection shields to guarantee “tamper
resistance”, are no PUFs because they are not security-
memory bounded. A conventionally secured memory has
been called “controlled” by Gassend et al.[12] 3. The qual-
itative novelty of PUFs, characterized by the second condi-
tion in the definition (2), is that their security mechanisms
go beyond such conventional (access) control.
Unique physical labels as they are used, e.g., on banknotes
or drug packages against counterfeiting are no PUFs, not
conceptually permanently connected to an encoder module
as required by our definition (2). “Physically obfuscated
keys” [13] with a read-out mechanism for the key are PUFs
because their obfuscation through a non-standard storage
mechanism is security-memory bound.
3Gassend et al. call a PUF controlled “if it can only be
accessed via an algorithm that is linked to the PUF in an
inseparable way (i.e. any attempt to circumvent the algo-
rithm will lead to the destruction of the PUF.” If we replace
“PUF” by “information-storage system” and interpret “al-
gorithm” as “hardware-interface that implements the sys-
tem’s intended functionality”, this is a definition of the hith-
erto conventional manner to protect an information-storage
system against duplication.
Render it more difficult to duplicate
the storage functionality F on a
separate device
Security Objective
F = release R F = release R∆within    t 
Mathematical duplicate
Arbiter PUF 
SRAM PUF
Public PUF
Physical duplicate Ring Osc. PUF
Optical PUFQuantum PUF
Figure 2: Classification of the PUFs’ security ob-
jectives; some existing PUFs are assigned to these
classes.
3. PUF CLASSIFICATION
3.1 Classification Criteria
3.1.1 Security Objectives
The most basic classification is by security objectives. Ac-
cording to the first condition in definition (2) the objectives
are characterized by the precise nature of the storage func-
tionalities and the kind of duplication to be prevented. The
simplest storage functionalities are:
S1. To store physical information and to release it upon
some challenge which can be:
S1.a. a simple trigger or
S1.b. a sophisticated address, chosen by the user.
An example for a more sophisticated storage functionality
is:
S2. the release of the stored information within a cer-
tain time interval ∆t.
There are two widely used meanings of the term “dupli-
cate”[3].
D1. “Physical duplication” is to prevent a duplication
in physical detail. I.e. the separate duplicated system either
follows the specifications for the construction of the original,
or at least returns physically identical responses.
D2. “Mathematical duplication” only requires that the
duplication system returns responses with the same informa-
tion content as the ones of the original module to all chal-
lenges. Its physical structure is otherwise not constrained.
D2 is a more ambitious objective than D1 because it requires
to absolutely prevent the readout of the stored information
at the challenge addresses, also against sophisticated mod-
eling attacks[18]. As soon as this information is read out,
it can be stored in another memory under the same address
thus realizing a mathematical clone. D1 can still be attain-
able when the stored information is known to the attacker.
Fig. 2 illustrates the storage-functionality classes and gives
examples of PUFs within them.
The security objectives are determined by the security ar-
chitecture that uses the PUF rather than the architecture of
the PUF itself. In Section 3.2, we will discuss classification
examples for some PUFs including one that can have both
objective D1 or D2 in different contexts.
3.1.2 Security Mechanisms
Three principal classes of security mechanisms for PUFs
have been proposed up to now.
Security mechanism 1 “Complex Structure”(CS). A com-
plex structure of the information-storage module prevents
analysis and/or reproduction.
Most PUFs that were proposed up to now rely on this prin-
ciple. Usually the following principle is exploited: it is easier
to create a complex random structure, than to analyze and
duplicate it. Such PUFs are produced in a process that
creates some complex structure in the storage module from
which random responses can be derived by the encode mod-
ule[14]. We classify this security mechanism as PUFs with
“Complex-Structure upon Production” (CSP) property.
Security mechanism 2 “No Cloning”(NC). A principle
of physics forbids the duplication of the storage module.
This is a security mechanism that prevents the duplication
of the storage unit because of some fundamental principle
of physics. An example are physical quantum systems in a
state unknown to the attacker, that cannot be cloned due
to the “no cloning principle”[15].
Security Mechanism 3 “Cryptostorage”. Let us call a
subset of all possible challenges the set of secret challenges
(s-challenges). The secret responses (s-responses) to be pro-
tected are defined as the responses to the s-challenges. The
security mechanism prevents that the attacker can apply all
or most s-challenges.
If the attacker cannot apply an s-challenge in principle she
will not be able to get the corresponding secret (response),
i.e. cryptostorage protects the physical stored information
against read out. Cryptostorage is closely analogous to cryp-
tographic encryption. This parallel will be further developed
in Section 4.
Two general architectures to realize cryptostorage in prac-
tice have been proposed [8].
Security mechanism 3a. “Minimum Readout Time (MRT)”.
The number of challenge-response pairs is chosen very large.
Then, if there is a sufficiently long minimum readout time
for one challenge-response pair, the attacker cannot apply
the s-challenges within a reasonable time period if the set of
s-challenges is unknown to her.
PUFs with a MRT-mechanism are a.k.a. as “strong” PUFs
[13].
Security mechanism 3b. “Erasure Upon Readout (EUR)”.
If a non s-challenge is applied the s-response corresponding
to the s-challenge is erased. Therefore the attacker cannot
apply the s-challenge if it is not known to her, because an
attempt to do so, erases most of the secret information in
general.
Fig. 3 illustrates which PUF constructions are protected by
these mechanisms.
3.2 Exemplary Classification of some Existing
PUFs
The ring-oscillator PUF [11] and the SRAM PUF [16] ex-
ploit variations in ring oscillator frequencies or memory cell
balances respectively, to generate secret bits and store the
information in a currently unconventional manner. The se-
curity mechanism is to generate a random value during fabri-
cation i.e. it is a CSP mechanism. The security objective of
the ring-oscillator PUF [11] and the SRAM PUF [16] (a.k.a
“weak PUFs” [13]) can be twofold. One possible aim is to
prevent the physical duplication (security objective D1 in
Quantum
Token
Mechanism No cloning
Mechanism Complex
Structure
Mechanism Cryptostorage
Arbiter PUF
Optical PUF
SRAM PUF
Coating PUF
Ring. Osc. PUF
Figure 3: The PUF security mechanisms and PUFs
that are based on them. See Section 3.1.2 for further
explanation.
Section 3.1.1). This security objective will typically arise in
a context in which one aims to make it difficult for the pro-
ducer of the PUF to produce physical duplicates. The other
possible aim is to render the mathematical duplication (se-
curity objective D2 in Section 3.1.1) more difficult by mak-
ing a readout in the switched-off state more difficult. This
second aim cannot reasonably be to prevent the read-out of
the stored information altogether because no security mech-
anism of SRAM and ring-oscillators prevents such readout.
The arbiter PUF [17] uses intrinsic delay variations in mi-
crochips and was proposed to be used with an s-challenge
that is much smaller than the set of all challenges. It thus
aims to prevent the mathematical duplication (security ob-
jective D2, in Section 3.1.1) with the help of both the CSP
mechanism and cryptostorage with the MRT mechanism.
For quantum-token based PUFs [15], the security objective
D2 is reached via proving that the s-challenge is necessary
to extract the previously stored information. Therefore, this
PUF prevents mathematical duplication with the help of
the NC mechanism and cryptostorage with the EUR mech-
anism.
A qualitatively special authentication functionality is real-
ized with the “public PUF” [9, 10] idea, which proposes
PUFs that can prove their authenticity even though their
challenge-response pairs are public. A public PUF not only
stores and protects information, but is also required to re-
spond to the challenge within a certain minimum time pe-
riod. It has the objective to prevent the construction of a
duplicate that releases a response within a certain time pe-
riod, even though a module that releases it within a much
longer period must be possible.
4. A NEW SECURITY PRIMITIVE:
CRYPTOSTORAGE
4.1 Description of the Primitive
The security mechanism of “cryptostorage” first intro-
duced in Section 3.1.2 is of fundamental importance. It can
be characterized in the following manner:
• Definition of the cryptostorage mechanism (4)
A clearstring is a string of bits physically stored in
an information-storage system with no security mech-
anism. A cryptostorage mechanism is a s-challenge-
dependent mapping from a clearstring to the storage
module of a PUF. Its security objective is that an at-
tacker finds no mechanism for the extraction of the
clearstring from the PUF without the set of s-challenges.
The s-challenge is a string of bits that designates a
subset of the address space of the information-storage
system.
When one compares this definition with the one of a cryp-
tographic encryption algorithm (3), the close analogy be-
tween the two is obvious: the s-challenge is equivalent to the
key, the storage system of the PUF to the cryptogram and
the clearstring to the cleartext. If cryptographic encryption
is the science of concealed (crypto) writing (graphein), re-
search and development on PUFs can be identified as the sci-
ence of concealed storage, or “cryptostorage”. Cryptostor-
age protects the physical information4 itself. Cryptographic
encryption protects the meaning of the information5 in the
cryptogram. The close parallel between cryptographic en-
cryption and cryptostorage is illustrated in Table 1.
In cryptographic encryption, principles and comprehensi-
ble systematic arguments (not necessarily proofs) based on
mathematics and informatics ensure that the cleartext can-
not be extracted without the key. In an analogous manner,
in cryptostorage, principles based on physics and electrical
engineering must ensure that the stored information cannot
be extracted without being in possession of the s-challenges.
The analog of cryptanalytic analyses of cryptographic en-
cryption are, e.g., attacks using various forms of sophisti-
cated learning programs[18].
The specific value of cryptostorage for embedded security
is the systematic practical and theoretical development of
information-storage systems that remain secure when the
attacker can directly and completely access them, i.e. uses
their regular read-out system. It will be necessary to de-
velop the primitive of cryptostorage in a systematic man-
ner because it will always remain impossible in principle to
completely deny access to embedded storage systems. The
major aim of cryptostorage will be to develop PUFs with
a comprehensible, well understood security level based on
sound principles of engineering, physics and mathematics.
5. FUTURE PUF RESEARCH
The two most basic question are:
1. What new security objectives for PUFs could there be?
Which PUF storage-functionalities, besides the simple, ad-
dressed and timed release of information could be useful?
2. What new security mechanisms, besides the CS, NC and
cryptostorage classes could there be?
The cryptostorage security primitive is bound to play a sim-
ilarly important role in embedded security as cryptographic
encryption does. Many proposed PUFs are based on it, but
the security of these proposals still need further study. The
foundations of cryptostorage need to be developed systemat-
ically: Which further standard design principles for physical
memories could be given up, to make them security-memory
bounded? How can EUR PUFs be constructed which are
not based on quantum-storage? How can it be ensured that
4Physical information is a physical system that has a certain
computable relation to the outside world in space an time.
5The meaning of information is a description of the relation
between physical information and outside world.
Cryptographic encryption Cryptostorage
1. meaning of Information physical Information
2. cryptogram PUF storage module
3. crypto-algorithm cryptostorage mechanism
4. inversion of cryptogram reproduction of PUF
5. cryptographic key s-challenge
6. encrypt with key store at s-challenge adr.
7. decrypt with key apply s-chall. & measure
Table 1: A listing of corresponding concepts of
cryptographic encryption and cryptostorage. 1.
What is protected? 2. Where is protected infor-
mation? 3. What is the security mechanism that 4.
prevents what?
MRT PUFs with N secret elements require on the order of
2N challenge-response pairs to extract all contained infor-
mation even under sophisticated learning attacks? Another
important research topic are algorithms and protocols to
support PUF-based applications.
If a new “PUF protocol”, e.g., for authentication is pro-
posed, it should be communicated which of its features are
PUF specific, and why. Otherwise, it would be a general
authentication protocol, i.e., its novelty cannot lie in its ap-
plicability to PUFs.
6. CERTIFICATION OF PUFS
A first step in a PUF security evaluation must be to ascer-
tain that a hardware element within a target of evaluation
(TOE) is really a PUF according to our proposed definition.
The next step will be to identify the PUF’s security objec-
tives within the TOE’s architecture and the security mech-
anisms that fulfill these objectives. The central task of a
PUF certification will be to theoretically model and verify
the PUF’s security mechanism in simulation and practice.
Possible effects of the PUF’s security mechanism on other
conventional, non-PUF mechanism that secure the protected
memory also need to be considered.
Classifying the PUF according to the characteristics in Sec-
tion 3 will be useful to lay out the scope of the evalua-
tion. Precisely defined security objectives clearly determine
the tasks of the security mechanisms. If, e.g., the PUF
has an internally generated random value as response (CSP
mechanism), the machine producing it assumes the role of a
Random-Number Generator (RNG). It will then be neces-
sary to evaluate the manufacturing system, e.g., according
to the existing guidelines for the certification of RNGs [19].
PUFs can be valuable because they reach new levels of se-
curity, but also because they allow cheaper solutions than
conventional approaches. Therefore, security evaluations of
PUFs must not just address whether a PUF can be repro-
duced but also at which effort.
7. CONCLUSION
We proposed to define PUFs as physical memories de-
signed with the objective to protect a well defined storage
functionality against duplication with a mechanism that is
inseparable from the information-storage mechanism. PUFs
in this sense seem to completely characterize what the com-
munity always meant by this concept.
We welcome challenges to this claim.
Our definition does not restrict PUF architectures in any
way, but provides a clear separation to other conventional
security modules. Conventional secure memories in which
information-storage and security mechanism are separable,
i.e. protect against access to the informations-storage sys-
tem, are no PUFs. In principle, their security mechanism
can also protect entities different from associated memories.
Therefore, a classification of such architectures as two inde-
pendent security and storage architectures is more appro-
priate.
We argue that PUF research and development is a much
more fundamental and important field than previously thought.
In a sense, it is the discipline of the secure storage of phys-
ical information itself, just as cryptography is the field of
secure writing of the meaning of information.
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